Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law
Ofer Eldar, Yale University
Co-authored by Lorenzo Magnolfi, Yale University
There is a longstanding debate concerning the desirability of state competition for corporate charters, and allowing firms to choose the corporate governance laws that apply to them through incorporation decisions. Delaware dominates the market for incorporations, though recently Nevada, a state with laws that are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. To address this debate, we develop an empirical model of firms' choice of corporate governance laws based on a set of legal and firm characteristics, and where firms' choices are subject to inertia. We estimate the model using a novel database of firm incorporation decisions from 1995 through 2013. Our study reveals several findings. First, despite relatively small shifts in market shares and few reincorporations, states' corporate laws have a significant effect on firm incorporation decisions. Although it is impossible for states to compete with Delaware by copying its laws, there is elasticity in the demand for corporate laws, which is concealed by inertia in decision-making. Second, we find that large corporations dislike protectionist laws, particularly anti-takeover statutes and provisions that exempt officers from liability. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that Delaware could lose significant market share and revenues if it were to adopt such laws. The recent shift of firms to Nevada is mainly due to small firms with low institutional shareholdings. The concern about possible market crashes has important consequence on asset pricing. Such tail events in a given sample period may not realize, driving a wedge between the ex-ante downside risk perceived by investors and the ex-post realized losses during the given sample. This Peso problem has been proposed to explain the equity premium puzzle, but its existence has not been rigorously verified. We propose a methodology to examine the existence and to measure the extent of the Peso problem by using information from both asset returns and prices of options written on the asset jointly. The methodology features conditional time-varying Peso problem measure estimated nonparametrically. Applying the framework to the S&P 500 Index over the period from 1996 to 2013, we find supportive evidence of the existence of Peso problem and document pro-cyclical dynamics of the Peso problem measure.
Shadow Banking and Asset Pricing
Jinji Hao, Washington University in St. Louis A shadow banking system featuring collateral constraints is studied to investigate the joint determination of haircut and interest rate, as well as its interaction with collateral asset pricing. The banks with limited commitment serve the households' need for consumption smoothing by taking deposits with a risky asset used as collateral and pursue the maximal leverage returns. In a collateral equilibrium as in Geanakoplos (1997, 2003) , agents' marginal rates of substitution are equalized only in non-default states, only the deposit contract with the highest liquidity value per unit of collateral is traded, and the risky asset price is boosted such that banks earn zero profit. Relative to the traditional banking with full commitment, banks are better off if they are endowed with the collateral asset while households are strictly worse off. I also find (i) higher households' risky asset endowment leads to a higher asset price because a stronger saving motive creates a scarcity of collateral, while higher banks' collateral endowment has the opposite effects; (ii) collateral use exhibits a diminishing return to scale in the amount of borrowing supported; (iii) for the quality of collateral, the higher asset price resulting from an upside improvement simply leads to a higher haircut with the interest rate unchanged since lenders do not care about upside risk; on the contrary, for lenders with a high risk aversion, a downside improvement of quality decreases the asset price because it alleviates the tension of imperfect risk sharing and, therefore, reduces the collateral value, but everything goes in opposite directions for a low risk aversion. 
Currency Returns in Different Time Zones

Lesser-Known Stocks and Signal Cleanse
Chengwei Wang, INSEAD I study investors' unease with lesser-known stocks (LKS) within mutual fund holdings and how fund managers address it. I argue that investors are averse to allocating money to LKS-dominated funds because uncertainty about holdings' payoff blurs their belief about the fund manager's ability. In response to this, fund managers exist as cleaners who wipe out investors' uncertainty by reducing the noise in fund returns (which I refer to as "signal cleanse"). I provide evidence of this in a panel of U.S. equity funds over the period 1992-2012. I find that LKS-dominated funds attract less capital and their fund flows are more sensitive to past performance compared to others overloading better-known stocks, suggesting that investors who are unsure of holdings' value rely more heavily on realized fund returns to make capital allocation decisions. On the other hand, LKS-dominated funds generate more persistent riskadjusted returns, providing investors with peace of mind. Active portfolio diversification and rebalancing are the main channels of return noise "cleansing".
Taken together, these results suggest that reassuring investors in their exploration of informational inefficient stocks is a valuable service provided by mutual funds.
Board Classification and Shareholder Value: Evidence from
Corporate Law Amendments
Daehyun Kim, University of Texas at Austin
This study examines the shareholder value impact of board classification. Prior studies find a negative correlation between classified boards and shareholder value, but do not establish causality. A concern is that this negative association can be interpreted as either a negative shareholder value effect of classified boards or an equilibrium corporate governance phenomenon, resulting in contradictory policy implications. This study contributes direct and causal evidence using a natural experiment based on corporate law amendments that impose a board classification change. The market reaction surrounding legislative events identifies a perceived shareholder value change caused by the prospect of an exogenous shift in board classification. The results suggest that the market perceives classified boards as reducing shareholder value and declassified boards as improving it. This evidence is consistent with shareholder activists' argument that board declassification benefits shareholders.
Nancy Xu, Columbia University
In this paper, I find the correlation between consumption growth and dividend growth to be procyclical. By solving a variant of the Campbell and Cochrane model which now allows for this procyclical comovement, I show that this procyclicality potentially explains the "procyclicality puzzle'' raised by Duffee (2005) who empirically finds that equity returns and consumption growth co-move procyclically (i.e., a procyclical amount of risk). As the key improvement to CC's habit model, the price-dividend ratio is more volatile and more positively skewed now; during good times, investors expect the dividend-consumption comovement to go down in the future, which induces a second upward effect on price today, in addition to the first upward effect caused by the current low local curvature (as in CC). Admittedly, however, the equity premium is lower because equity returns now provide partial hedges against bad consumption times. Furthermore, the theory suggests that the procyclical comovement positively predicts (very) short-horizon future excess returns but negatively predicts long-horizon future excess returns.
Liquidity Shortages and Contagious Debt Runs
Hyunsoo Doh, University of Chicago This paper develops a model in which concurrent runs on multiple (two) firms with uncorrelated fundamentals arise because their creditors are uncertain about future liquidity shortages. In this economy, one firm may exit a market earlier than the other either because its asset has expired or it has failed to repay its creditors. Only the latter case shrinks external market liquidity and thus hurts the collateral value of a remaining firm. But creditors' fear of the future liquidity drought suffices to generate widespread runs even before any single firm defaults. Specifically, in this economy creditors optimally adjust their rollover strategies as the fundamental of their opponent firm fluctuates. We derive a unique equilibrium via iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Lastly, we show that under certain conditions, if one firm either reduces its principal payments or lengthens its debt maturity, it creates positive externalities to the whole economy.
